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THE IMPACT OF REGULATION ON GROWTH AND INFORMALITY: 











This paper studies the effects of regulation on economic growth and the relative size of the 
informal sector in a large sample of industrial and developing countries.  Along with firm 
dynamics, informality is an important channel through which regulation affects 
macroeconomic performance and economic growth in particular.  The paper concludes that 
a heavier regulatory burden --particularly in product and labor markets-- reduces growth 
and induces informality.  These effects are, however, mitigated as the overall institutional 
framework improves. 
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I.  Introduction 
The enactment of regulation follows a process where valid social goals are 
combined with the objectives of particular interest groups (see Djankov, La Porta, López-
de-Silanes, and Shleifer 2002).  Whatever their justifications and objectives, regulations 
are bound to have an impact beyond their area of control and exert an effect on the overall 
economy.  This effect has two basic channels: the dynamics of firm restructuring and the 
formation and evolution of the informal sector.  Using a large sample of industrial and 
developing countries, this paper examines empirically the overall effect of business 
regulation on economic growth and on the relative size of the informal sector, thus starting 
an exploration of the informal-sector channel of regulation.
1  
The key to a healthy economy is the flexibility to manage negative shocks and take 
advantage of growth opportunities.  Intentionally or not, regulation can impose rigidities 
and distort the incentives for factor reallocation, capital accumulation, competition, and 
innovation.  For those firms that abide by the regulatory environment, this distorts the 
normal process of firm creation, growth, and disappearance –the Schumpeterian process of 
“creative destruction.”  Through this firm-dynamics channel, regulation can have a 
macroeconomic impact by both worsening recessionary periods and reducing trend growth.  
This is not, however, the whole impact of regulation.  In the absence of perfect monitoring 
and compliance, some firms will find it optimal –or simply necessary—to evade 
regulations and work outside the strict legal regime.  Avoidance of regulations, however, 
does not mean that they cease to have an effect.   
The informal sector –the result of the loose aggregation of firms and activities 
outside the regulatory framework—is the second-best response of an economy facing 
shocks and trying to grow.
2  The response is second-best because it entails losing, at least 
partially, the advantages of legality, such as police and judicial protection, access to formal 
credit institutions, and participation in international markets.  Moreover, trying to escape 
the control of the state forces many informal firms to remain sub-optimally small, use 
                                                 
1 We explore the firm-dynamics channel in a related paper (Loayza, Oviedo and Servén, 2005b). 
2 For an excellent review of the causes and consequences of the informal sector, see Schneider and Enste 
(2000).  Drawing from a public-choice approach, Gerxhani (2004) provides an interesting discussion of the 
differences of the informal sector in developed and developing countries.  The classic study of informality is, 
of course, De Soto (1989).   2 
irregular procurement and distribution channels, and constantly divert resources to mask 
their activities or simply bribe officials.  Therefore, as compared with a first-best response, 
the expansion of the informal sector often represents distorted and insufficient economic 
growth.
3  In addition, the informal sector can generate a negative externality that 
compounds its adverse effect on growth: by avoiding taxes, informal activities use and 
congest public infrastructure without helping to replenish it.  If public infrastructure 
complements private capital in the process of economic growth, a larger informal sector 
will imply smaller growth.
4  The simple cross-country comparison presented in Figure 1 
suggests that countries where the relative size of the informal sector is larger tend to grow 
at a slower pace.      
In assessing the impact of regulation, it is essential to consider that this impact is 
likely to depend not only on the quantity of regulation, but also on its quality.  There are 
good reasons for this.  On analytical grounds, certain types of regulation – such as those 
designed to enhance competition in goods or financial markets – should be expected to 
exert beneficial effects on economic performance, rather than adverse ones.   More 
generally, countries with better institutions tend to create regulatory environments 
genuinely aimed to improve business conditions rather than privilege a few interest 
groups.
5  They are also more likely to enforce regulation in a transparent and even-handed 
manner, limiting the regulator’s margin for arbitrariness and corruption that can place 
many firms at a disadvantage.  All these arguments suggest that the quality of regulation is 
likely to be closely related to overall governance quality, and thus in our experiments we 
use standard governance indicators to capture and examine the importance of regulatory 
quality. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Section II describes the synthetic 
regulation indicators and presents some stylized facts concerning the patterns of regulation 
                                                 
3 This does not necessarily mean that informal sector firms are not dynamic or lagging behind their formal 
counterparts (see Maloney 2004 for evidence on the dynamism of Latin American informal firms).  In fact, in 
equilibrium the risk-adjusted returns in both sectors should be similar.  The stagnation arguments presented 
in the text are relative to the first-best response and not with respect to a sclerotic economy unable to 
circumvent its regulation-induced rigidities.     
4 See Loayza (1996) for an endogenous-growth model highlighting the negative effect of informality through 
the congestion of public services. 
5 This is the argument in Claessens and Klapper (2002).   3 
across countries.  Section III reports estimates of the impact of regulation on economic 
growth and the size of the informal sector.  Section IV offers some concluding remarks. 
 
II. Measuring Business Regulation 
In this section, we briefly describe our measures of regulation and their sources.  
We also discuss differences in regulation intensity across countries for different levels of 
economic development. 
We construct indices to measure business regulation in the following seven areas: 
firm entry, labor markets, fiscal burden,  trade barriers, financial markets, contract 
enforcement, and bankruptcy regulation.  Each index is obtained as an average of related 
components, normalized to vary within a unit interval with higher values representing 
heavier regulatory burden.
6  The components used to construct the seven synthetic indices 
are obtained from the following data sources: Doing Business (The World Bank Group), 
Index of Economic Freedom (The Heritage Foundation), Economic Freedom of the World 
(The Fraser Institute), Labor Market Indicators Database (M. Rama and R. Artecona, 
2000), The Corporate Tax Rates Survey (KPMG), and International Country Risk Guide 
(The PRS Group).  These sources cover the largest number of countries and areas under 
regulation, and their measures use a clear methodology and are straightforward.  Except for 
the Labor Market Indicators Database, all sources are public.  Our sample covers 75 
countries. 
In most cases, data are based on surveys conducted in a single year (in the late 
1990s) in a large group of countries; for components with observations for more than one 
year, we use average values over the period.  Therefore, our indices should be interpreted 
as average regulation levels in the late 1990s.  We should note, however, that regulation 
tends to stay constant over long periods of time.  
Table 1 shows simple correlations between the seven regulation indices.
  The 
strongly positive correlations among all but the fiscal burden and labor indices suggest that 
regulation policy comes in “packages.”  Judging from these correlations, we can 
distinguish three regulation categories: fiscal, labor, and product-market regulations, where 
                                                 
6 We refer the interested reader to Loayza, Oviedo and Servén (2005a) for details on the construction and 
components the business regulation indices.   4 
the latter is a composite of the entry, trade, financial markets, bankruptcy, and contract 
enforcement indices.  We obtain the product-market index by averaging the scores of the 
five components.
7  We also compute an overall regulation index by averaging the scores of 
all seven components.  We choose to give equal weights to all components despite the 
strong correlation among the first five because we don’t have any priors about the 
importance of labor market or fiscal regulation relative to the others. 
Figure 2 depicts scatter plots of the overall, product-market, labor, and fiscal 
regulation indices against the (the log of) GDP per capita of all countries in the sample.  
The product-market regulation index is strongly negatively related to average income, and 
so is the overall regulation index, reflecting the fact that it loads heavily on product- 
market regulations.  Labor regulation also has a negative correlation with average income, 
but it is smaller and not statistically significant.  The relationship between fiscal regulation 
and income is strong but of the opposite sign as those of the other types of regulation: 
richer countries tend to have heavier fiscal regulation.   
Finally, we use a governance index in order to assess the quality of regulation itself 
and the general context that determines how regulation functions.  We construct this index 
using three measures from the International Country Risk Guide: absence of corruption in 
the political system, prevalence of law and order, and level of democratic accountability.  
The last panel of Figure 2 shows the close connection between our governance index and 
per capita GDP. 
 
III.  Regulation, Economic Growth, and Informality  
Having described how the regulatory environment varies across countries, our 
objective for this section is examining whether regulations have an impact on economic 
growth and the size of the informal sector.  Establishing the connection between regulation 
and informality is a first step in understanding how regulation affects economic growth.  In 
assessing the effect of the regulatory environment, it is important to consider that the 
quality of regulation is profoundly affected by the institutional context in which it is 
imposed.  Thus, regulation’s ultimate impact is likely to be affected by the country’s level 
                                                 
7 The term “product-market regulations” is taken from Nicoletti et al. (2000).   5 
of institutional development.  In order to explore the interaction between institutional 
progress and regulatory environment, we extend the basic empirical analysis by allowing 
the effects of regulation to vary with the measure of governance described above. 
Sample and specification 
Our empirical methodology is based on cross-country regression analysis.  We 
conduct separate regressions for each dependent variable of interest, namely, economic 
growth and the size of the informal sector.  In each case, we use as explanatory variables a 
measure of regulation and a set of basic control variables.  Table 2 presents descriptive 
statistics of all variables used in the paper. 
The sample consists of 72 - 75 countries, depending on the regression exercise.  In 
the largest sample, we have 22 developed and 53 developing countries, of which 21 belong 
to Latin America, 22 to Africa and the Middle East, and 10 to Asia.  Country observations 
for each variable correspond to averages for the 1990s.  We are constrained to this decade 
because internationally comparable regulation measures are available only for this period. 
The dependent variables are defined as follows.  Regarding economic growth, its 
measure is standard in the literature and is given by the average annual growth rate of real 
GDP per capita.  For our second dependent variable --the size of the informal sector-- there 
is no standard measure.  To the contrary, there is much dispute as to what exactly the 
informal sector is, and this controversy naturally extends to all attempts to measure it (see 
Schneider and Enste, 2000).  The definition we use in this paper identifies informality with 
regulation evasion.  This definition is not only the most relevant given the focus of this 
paper, but it has also become the most popular since the seminal work by De Soto (1989).  
The informal sector thus defined is a shadow economy whose size is best represented as a 
latent variable.  This is the approach taken by Schneider (2004) to provide estimates of the 
size of the informal sector --as production in percentage of GDP-- for 145 countries for the 
period 2000-2003.
8   
Schneider’s study combines the DYMIMIC (dynamic multiple-indicators-multiple-
causes) with currency-demand-based approaches to the estimation of the informal sector as 
a latent variable.  More precisely, the informal sector comprises (non-criminal) economic 
activities that go undeclared specifically in order to avoid compliance with costly 
                                                 
8 Loayza (1996) uses a similar approach for his estimates of the informal sector in Latin American countries.   6 
regulation (in particular employment protection laws), tax payments, and social security 
contributions.  It, therefore, excludes criminal activities and home-based production.  We 
use Schneider’s estimates because, first, they are the most comprehensive estimates 
obtained using a unified method, and, second, they are used by a number of other studies.  
However, as with the measurement of any other latent variable, these estimates of the size 
of the informal sector should be considered with caution.  They are likely to pick up a large 
amount of measurement error; and in the particular case of the DYMIMIC procedure, the 
estimates depend largely on the theoretical relation between the variable of interest and the 
indicators, which may be subject to debate. Although highly important and interesting, a 
detailed discussion of the estimation of the informal sector is beyond the scope of this 
paper. 
As described in the previous section, our explanatory variables of interest in the 
growth and informality regressions are indices that quantify a country’s regulatory burden.  
We consider, in turn, the overall regulation index and its three main components-- the 
product-market, labor, and fiscal regulation indices.  In extensions to the basic 
specification, we interact the regulation index with a governance proxy, which as already 
noted is constructed from information on experts’ perceptions on public accountability, 
absence of corruption, and rule of law, as reported by the International Country Risk 
Guide.  
The set of control variables for the growth regressions consists of the initial level of 
per capita real GDP (to account for convergence effects), the initial rate of secondary 
enrollment (as proxy for human capital investment), the initial ratio of private domestic 
credit to GDP (to account for financial depth), and a Sub-Saharan dummy variable (to 
control for the particular conditions of civil conflict, mismanagement, and disease affecting 
this region).
9  For the regressions of the size of the informal sector, the control set is quite 
parsimonious consisting only of initial real GDP per capita.  Despite its parsimony, this 
variable summarizes most elements of economic development and is crucially important as 
a control given its strong relationship with both informality and regulation (see, as 
illustration, the corresponding bivariate correlations in Table 2).  
                                                 
9 The “Africa dummy” has a long tradition in empirical growth studies; see for example Easterly and Levine 
(1997).   7 
Results and discussion 
We start with a visual exercise.  Figures 3 and 4 show scatter plots that represent 
the simple relationship between the regulation indices and, respectively, economic growth 
and the size of the informal sector.  The graphs using overall regulation consistently 
suggest that more heavily regulated economies tend to grow less and be more informal.  
Observations reflecting poor economic growth, large informality, and high overall 
regulatory burden belong mostly to developing countries, while developed economies tend 
to occupy the other end of the distribution.  These links with overall regulation seem to be 
driven by product market regulation and, to a lesser extent, labor regulation.  Conversely, 
the connection with fiscal regulation appears to go in the opposite direction, so that 
economies with larger fiscal regulation show somewhat better economic growth and 
smaller informal sector.  We shall see if the opposite behavior of fiscal regulation survives 
the scrutiny of regression analysis. 
A more formal evaluation of the link between the regulation indices, growth, and 
informality requires multiple regression analysis, to which we turn now.  The regression 
results are organized as follows.  We first present the results on economic growth and then 
those on the relative size of the informal sector as dependent variables.  For each of them 
we start with a basic specification where the effect of regulation is unrelated to 
governance.  Then, we allow for the effects of regulation to vary with the quality of 
governance. 
Table 3.A presents the basic specification results on economic growth.  The overall 
index of regulation has a negative and significant association with economic growth, and 
so do the product market and labor regulation indices, while the index of fiscal regulation 
has no significant relation.   
Table 3.B presents the estimation results when we allow for the effect of regulation 
on growth to vary with the quality of governance.  The overall, product market, and labor 
regulation indices all carry significantly negative signs and their interaction terms with 
governance show a positive and significant coefficient.  Thus, the negative association of 
these regulation indices with economic growth appears to be mitigated when the quality of 
governance rises.  As to fiscal regulation, neither its direct coefficient nor the coefficient 
on the interaction term is statistically significant in the growth regression.    8 
How large or economically important are the growth effects of regulation?  Using 
the point estimates of the regression that accounts for governance interactions, we can 
perform some illustrative exercises.  If a country’s index of labor regulation were increased 
by one standard deviation in the cross-country sample (0.16) and its level of governance is 
equal to the world median (0.46), then its annual rate of per capita GDP growth would 
decrease by 0.3 percentage points.  More remarkably, if a typical developing country were 
to decrease its product-market regulation to the median level of industrial countries (that is, 
from 0.51 to 0.17) while maintaining its level of governance (equal to the median of 
developing countries, 0.37), then its annual growth rate would rise by about 1.7 percentage 
points.   
The point estimates of the coefficients are such that if the quality of governance is 
sufficiently high, the negative growth effect of an increase in regulation can be nearly 
cancelled.  For product-market regulations this threshold level is quite high and could only 
be approximated by countries like Switzerland, Sweden, or Canada.  For labor market 
regulations, the threshold is somewhat smaller and comparable to that of Ireland or 
Portugal. 
We now turn to the regressions where the dependent variable is the relative size of 
the informal sector (in terms of informal production as percentage of GDP).  Table 4.A 
presents the basic specification results.  The product-market and labor regulation indices 
carry positive and significant coefficients, suggesting that these types of regulation lead to 
more extensive informality.  The coefficient on overall regulation is also positive but fails 
to be statistically significant.  This weakened effect is apparently due to the inclusion of 
fiscal regulation in the overall index; indeed, fiscal regulation by itself carries a 
significantly negative coefficient.  This last result may seem rather puzzling, and we return 
to it below.  Regarding the control variable, as expected, the level of income per capita 
carries a significantly negative coefficient.  This indicates that, other things equal, 
informality is more prevalent in poorer countries. 
Table 4.B presents the results of the informality regressions when we include the 
interaction between regulation and governance as an additional explanatory variable.  The 
coefficients on overall, product-market, and labor regulation indices are positive and 
statistically significant.  Their corresponding interaction terms with the governance index   9 
carry a statistically negative coefficient.  Taken together, these results have a similar 
interpretation as those related to the growth regression: For low levels of governance 
(implying poor regulatory quality), an increase in product-market or labor regulation leads 
to an expansion of the informal sector.  As governance improves, the amplifying effect of 
these types of regulation on informality diminishes until it disappears.  This happens at 
moderately high levels of governance, the threshold value corresponding roughly to those 
of Greece, Spain, and Japan.  Regarding fiscal regulation, its direct coefficient is positive, 
changing signs with respect to that in the basic specification; it, however, fails to be 
statistically significant, and now it’s the interaction term with governance which carries a 
significantly negative coefficient.  This indicates that for low levels of governance (up to 
those roughly corresponding to Colombia and Pakistan), the impact of fiscal regulation on 
the size of the informal sector is zero; but as governance improves, higher fiscal regulation 
actually leads to a reduction in informality.  We can understand the puzzling negative 
relationship between fiscal regulation and informality by considering that the increase in 
fiscal burden not only makes evasion more attractive (which implies a positive 
relationship) but can also generate better public services and more resources for enforcing 
tax compliance (both of which make formality attractive).  When governance is 
sufficiently good, the formality-inducing effect of fiscal regulation prevails.      
As in the case of growth, we can use the estimated coefficients to ascertain how 
economically important the informality effects of regulation are.  Using the point estimates 
of the regression that accounts for governance interactions, let’s consider the changes in 
the size of the informal sector brought about by changes in labor and product-market 
regulations.  If a country’s index of labor regulation were increased by one standard 
deviation in the cross-country sample and its level of governance is equal to the world 
median, then the size of the informal sector relative to GDP would increase by nearly 3 
percentage points.  If a typical developing country decreased its product-market regulation 
to the median of industrial countries while keeping its level of governance, then its 
informal sector would decrease by close to 7 percentage points of GDP.     10 
 
IV.  Concluding Remarks 
Regulation is becoming a core policy factor to explain the bottlenecks to economic 
growth in many countries around the world.  Using a large sample of industrial and 
developing countries, this paper provides an evaluation of the impact of business 
regulation on economic growth and informality.   
Our regression analysis suggests that high levels of regulation are associated with 
lower growth.  This is clearly the case for product and labor market regulation.  However, 
the quality of regulation – as captured by the overall institutional framework – makes a big 
difference: in most instances we find that better institutions help mitigate, and even 
eliminate, the adverse impact of regulation on economic growth. 
The literature indicates two main channels through which regulation can have a 
negative impact on economic growth.  The first –and most popular—is the distortionary 
effect of regulation on the Schumpeterian process of firm dynamics.  The second –to which 
we devote our attention in this paper—is the incentive that regulation may create for firms 
to work outside the legal framework.  We start an exploration of the informality channel by 
assessing the effect of regulation on the size of the informal sector relative to GDP.  We 
find that an increase in either product-market or labor regulation leads to an expansion of 
informality.  As in the case of growth, this pernicious effect is gradually mitigated as 
governance --and thus regulatory quality-- improves.  Fiscal regulation has a different 
effect on informality (which may explain why we do not find a clearly negative impact of 
fiscal regulation on economic growth): when governance is not too low, an increase in 
fiscal regulation brings about a decrease in informality.  This can be explained by 
considering that an increase in fiscal regulation not only makes evasion more attractive but 
can also generate better public services and more resources for enforcing tax compliance.  
Theoretically, analogous positive effects could also apply to other product-market and 
labor regulation, but they are not discernible in the cross-country sample we study.            
Does the negative growth effect of regulations imply that they should be eliminated 
altogether?  This paper does not intend to assess the impact of regulation on social goals 
that could be beyond the strict sphere of economic growth – broad goals such as social 
equity and peace, or narrow ones such as worker safety, environmental conservation, and   11 
civil security, which typically motivate specific regulations.  Thus, our conclusions on the 
role of regulation must necessarily be evaluated in a more comprehensive context before 
drawing definitive social welfare implications.  At any rate, to the extent that economic 
growth is quite an important goal, our findings imply that streamlining regulation and 
strengthening governance in highly regulated countries could have a significant payoff.   12 
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Tables and Graphs 






Trade Bankruptcy Labor Fiscal Governance
Entry 1
Financial Markets 0.66*** 1
Contract 
Enforcement 0.66*** 0.58*** 1
Trade  0.63*** 0.73*** 0.62*** 1
Bankruptcy 0.52*** 0.44*** 0.53*** 0.51*** 1
Labor 0.39*** 0.1 0.44*** 0.05 0.14 1
Fiscal -0.50*** -0.27** -0.57*** -0.33*** -0.38*** -0.16 1
Governance -0.70*** -0.64*** -0.79*** -0.79*** -0.57*** -0.14 0.51*** 1
Product 
Market
Labor Fiscal Overall Governance
Product Market 1
Labor 0.26** 1
Fiscal -0.49*** -0.16 1
Overall 0.97*** 0.42*** -0.31*** 1
Governance -0.86*** -0.18 0.52** -0.80*** 1
Notes: *,**, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Source: Authors' estimation  
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Table 2:  Descriptive Statistics
Years: 1990-2003, 72-75 countries
(a) Univariate statistics
Variable Mean Median Standard Dev. Minimum Maximum
Growth rate of GDP per capita (%) 1.53 1.78 1.67 -2.71 6.22
Informal sector output (% of GDP) 33.64 34.55 14.69 8.60 67.83
Log of GDP per capita in logs in 1990 7.83 7.60 1.61 4.98 10.74
Log of secondary enrollment rate in 1990 3.86 3.97 0.69 1.89 4.78
Log of private domestic credit / GDP in 1990 3.42 3.35 0.93 0.68 5.29
Overall regulation index 0.44 0.46 0.12 0.16 0.69
Product market regulation index 0.42 0.45 0.18 0.08 0.77
Fiscal regulation index 0.53 0.52 0.19 0.10 0.92
Labor regulation index 0.47 0.48 0.16 0.13 0.78
Governance index 0.52 0.46 0.26 0.05 1.00
(b) Correlation coefficients between dependent variables, control variables, and regulation indices
Growth rate of 
GDP per capita
Informal sector 
output (% of GDP)
Log of GDP per 
capita in logs 
in 1990
Log of secondary 
enrollment rate in 
1990
Log of private 










Growth rate of GDP per capita 1
Informal sector output (% of GDP) -0.32*** 1
Log of GDP per capita in logs in 1990 0.33*** -0.69*** 1
Log of secondary enrollment rate in 1990 0.40*** -0.55*** 0.83*** 1
Log of private domestic credit / GDP in 1990 0.31*** -0.63*** 0.73*** 0.55*** 1
Overall regulation index -0.41*** 0.62*** -0.80*** -0.67*** -0.66*** 1
Product market regulation index -0.42*** 0.67*** -0.87*** -0.73*** -0.69*** 0.97*** 1
Fiscal regulation index 0.17 -0.51*** 0.49*** 0.49*** 0.41*** -0.31*** -0.49*** 1
Labor regulation index -0.14 0.24** -0.08 -0.11 -0.23** 0.42*** 0.26** -0.16 1
Governance index 0.35*** -0.78*** 0.86*** 0.68*** 0.65*** -0.80*** -0.86*** 0.51*** -0.14
Notes: *,**, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Source: Authors' estimation  
   15 
Table 3. Economic Growth and Burden of Regulation   
Sample: 73-75 countries, 1990 - 2000  Method of estimation: Ordinary Least Squares
Dependent variable: 
Economic growth: Average annual growth rate of GDP per capita, 1990-2000
A: Basic specification
Overall Product Market Labor Fiscal
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Regulation -5.71 -5.37 -1.71 0.75
  (index ranging from 0 to 1, higher meaning more regulated) -2.43 -2.67 -1.86 0.61
Control Variables:
Initial GDP per capita -0.52 -0.67 -0.17 -0.26
  (in logs) -2.22 -2.65 -0.78 -1.15
Initial education 0.53 0.46 0.47 0.52
  (log of secondary enrollment rate in 1990) 1.23 1.14 1.02 1.03
Initial financial depth 0.22 0.22 0.24 0.34
  (log of private domestic credit / GDP in 1990) 0.80 0.75 0.84 1.21
Sub-Saharan Africa dummy -1.71 -1.80 -1.80 -1.71
  (1 if country belongs to Sub-Saharan Africa and 0 otherwise) -3.59 -3.86 -3.53 -3.12
Constant 5.70 6.91 1.44 0.34
2.78 3.03 1.06 0.24
No. of observations 75 75 73 75
R-squared 0.34 0.36 0.29 0.28
B: With governance interactions
Overall Product Market Labor Fiscal
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Regulation -7.68 -7.70 -4.14 0.63
  (index ranging from 0 to 1, higher meaning more regulated) 2.13 -3.69 -2.79 0.39
Governance-Regulation interaction 6.80 7.45 5.02 0.21
  (Governance index * Regulation index) 2.13 2.64 2.31 0.12
  (Gov. index ranges from 0 to 1, higher meaning better governance)
Control Variables:
Initial GDP per capita -0.81 -0.87 -0.47 -0.28
  (in logs) -3.11 -3.51 -1.95 -0.92
Initial education 0.57 0.47 0.44 0.53
  (log of secondary enrollment rate in 1990) 1.51 1.33 1.09 1.07
Initial financial depth 0.27 0.29 0.22 0.34
  (log of private domestic credit / GDP in 1990) 0.86 0.90 0.68 1.20
Sub-Saharan Africa dummy -1.71 -1.72 -1.94 -1.71
  (1 if country belongs to Sub-Saharan Africa and 0 otherwise) -3.75 -3.78 -4.31 -3.09
Constant 7.10 7.83 3.98 0.46
3.26 3.32 2.57 0.22
No. of observations 75 75 73 75
R-squared 0.39 0.43 0.35 0.28
P-value of Ho: sum of regulation coefficients = 0 0.79 0.92 0.52 0.57
Notes: 
a) Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity (Newey-West).
b) t-Statistics are presented below the corresponding coefficient.
Source: Authors' estimation
Type of regulation index:
Type of regulation index:
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Table 4. Informality and Burden of Regulation
Sample: 72 countries, 1990-2003  Method of estimation: Ordinary Least Squares
Dependent variable: 
Informal sector output (% of GDP), 2000-2003
A: Basic specification
Overall Product Market Labor Fiscal
[1] [2] [3] [5]
Regulation 21.67 21.61 17.03 -16.62
  (index ranging from 0 to 1, higher meaning more regulated) 1.39 1.74 2.10 -1.96
Initial GDP per capita -5.04 -4.28 -6.25 -5.40
  (in logs) -4.65 -3.20 -10.08 -6.10
Constant 63.49 58.07 74.45 84.69
4.32 3.80 10.37 15.83
No. of observations 72 72 72 72
R-squared 0.49 0.50 0.52 0.52
B: With governance interactions
Overall Product Market Labor Fiscal
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Regulation 41.21 37.87 39.39 7.73
  (index ranging from 0 to 1, higher meaning more regulated) 2.55 2.87 3.51 0.63
Governance-Regulation interaction -65.84 -50.16 -48.76 -42.91
  (Governance index * Regulation index) -3.37 -3.03 -3.74 -3.03
  (Gov. index ranges from 0 to 1, higher meaning better governance)
Control Variables:
Initial GDP per capita -2.52 -3.01 -3.31 -1.93
  (in logs) -1.93 -2.22 -3.09 -1.33
Constant 48.41 50.18 52.45 57.50
3.28 3.38 5.13 5.53
No. of observations 72 72 72 72
R-squared 0.56 0.54 0.59 0.57
P-value of Ho: sum of regulation coefficients = 0 0.22 0.44 0.25 0.00
Notes: 
a) Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity (Newey-West).
b) t-Statistics are presented below the corresponding coefficient.
Source: Authors' estimation
Type of regulation index:
Type of regulation index:
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Note: *** denotes significance at the 1% level. 
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Overall regulation index
Correlation: -0.81***
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Product market regulation index
Correlation: -0.87***
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Labor regulation index
Correlation: -0.09
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Fiscal regulation index
Correlation: 0.49***




































































































Note: *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively. 
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Overall regulation index
Correlation: -0.41***
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Product market regulation index
Correlation: -0.42***
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Labor regulation index
Correlation: -0.14
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Fiscal regulation index
Correlation: 0.17

















































































































Note: *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively. 
   20 
 
















































































































.2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7
Overall regulation index
Correlation: 0.62***
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Product market regulation index
Correlation: 0.66***
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Labor regulation index
Correlation: 0.24**
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Fiscal regulation index
Correlation: -0.51***






















































































































Note: *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively. 
 